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FISCO v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES: THE INEQUITY OF
EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN CHILD
SUPPORT ARREARAGE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 1995, using a federal law' targeting the most egre-
gious deadbeat fathers, FBI agents arrested Jeffrey Nichols for fail-
ing to pay approximately $580,000 in child support.' Although the
law is fairly new, the problem of child support enforcement has
troubled this country for decades.' In the early 1970s, child support
enforcement was so inadequate4 that the federal government spent
$7.6 billion annually on welfare to provide for single parents.5 The
government has tried to remedy the problem,6 but seventy-five per-
cent of custodial mothers in this country continue either to lack
child support orders or to receive less than full payment under such
orders.7 Although Maine has received national acclaim for its child
support enforcement law,8 the issue continues to pose financial,
1. Section 228 of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 makes it a crime to
avoid paying child support by fleeing to another state. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. V
1993).
2. Judge Makes Sure Nation's Top Deadbeat Dad Stays Put, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Aug. 15, 1995, at 8A.
3. From 1970 to 1981, the number of divorces in America doubled. JOSEPH I.
LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 11 (1986). Also, from 1970 to 1981, the
number of children living with only one parent increased by 54% to 12.6 million. Of
the four million women who were owed child support in 1981, only 47% received the
full amount due, and 28% received nothing. li
4. HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, THE LEGAL PERSPECrIVE
281-82 (1981).
5. LIEBERMAN, supra note 3, at 6. The federal government became involved in
child support matters in 1935 when Congress implemented the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The government originally conceived of the
program as a way to provide the financial assistance necessary to keep orphaned or
abandoned children out of community institutions. The program operated by dis-
persing money from Washington into the states, and then to the relatives of depen-
dent children. Congress' original concern was with children whose fathers died.
However, the government eventually utilized the program as a way to assist children
whose fathers physically and financially abandoned them. Id. at 5.
6. See, eg., Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
378, 98 Stat. 1305; Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2393; Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
2453. The Amendments are codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C., 1988.
7. Margaret C. Haynes, Child Support and the Courts in the Year 2000, 17 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 693 (1994).
8. The Maine law threatens the revocation of drivers' and professional licenses
from parents who are behind in child support payments. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 305 (West Supp. 1994-1995). See also Clinton Likes Maine's Law on
Deadbeats, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 20, 1994, at All; Deadbeat Dads Lose
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moral, and legal problems for Maine's legislators, courts, and
parents.
In Fisco v. Department of Human Services9 the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held that in an action for
child support arrearages, it was "unreasonable" for the defendant,
Fisco, to rely on his former wife's written discharge of his child sup-
port obligations.10 The court rejected his defense of laches, defined
as negligence or omission to seasonably assert a right that results in
prejudice to the defendant." Fisco's reliance on the agreement did
not demonstrate the requisite prejudice despite twelve years of ap-
parent complacency on the part of his former wife. 2
This Note contends that the Law Court's decision in Fisco created
a uniquely heightened standard of prejudice 13 in laches defenses for
application in child support arrearage cases. In cases where parties
have engaged in private agreements or modifications, the court has
inextricably linked prejudice with whether a defendant's reliance on
that agreement was reasonable. For any party who uses a laches
defense in a child support arrearage case, and who attempts to show
that the requisite prejudice is premised upon an unincorporated or
private agreement, the court has created an essentially insurmounta-
ble evidentiary burden. The court's analysis demonstrates its gen-
eral unwillingness to grant laches or other equitable defenses in
child support arrearage cases.
Although this Author contends that Fisco was correctly decided,
the court's reasoning produced an unnecessarily esoteric definition
of prejudice, and an undiscriminating concept of equity. The Law
Court manipulated equitable principles in order to reject a defense
to a child support claim. Instead, the Law Court should evaluate
child support arrearage cases by focusing upon the duty of support
owed to a child by the child's non-custodial parent. This Author
argues that focusing upon the child's interest in, and basic legal right
to parental financial support during his or her minority reveals the
unconditional impropriety of entertaining laches and other equita-
ble defenses in child support arrearage cases. Judicial decisions af-
fecting child support should begin with the presumption that
Licenses; Maine Cracks Down on Child Support, S.F. ExAhMNER, June 28, 1994, at
B10; Mike Doming, License Loss a Real Threat to Deadbeats; Maine Child-Support
Plan Sets Example, Cm. TRm., Apr. 10, 1995, at N1; Ellen Goodman, No Deadbeats
at the Wheel, BostoN GLOBE, July 28, 1994, at 11.
9. 659 A.2d 274 (Me. 1995).
10. Id. at 275.
11. Leathers v. Stewart, 108 Me. 96, 101, 79 A. 16, 18 (1911).
12. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 275.
13. One of the principal constituents of laches is injury, prejudice, or disadvan-
tage to the defendant in the event that relief is granted to the complainant. 30A
CJ.S. Equity § 133 (1992).
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throughout their minority, children are owed a duty of support. 4
Like the application of the "best interest of the child" standard, re-
quired in all cases pertaining to parental rights and responsibilities
(custody), 5 the Law Court should presume that child support is one
of the essential factors in providing for the welfare of the children of
divorce. As such, the enforcement of such orders is critical. The
Law Court should decide affirmatively that equitable defenses in
this context are neither available nor appropriate and should direct
any inquiries toward upholding the interests of the unnamed party
in every child support arrearage case-the child.
II. LACHES AS A DEFENSE TO BAR RECOVERY OF CHILD
SUPPORT ARREARAGES: MAINE JURISPRUDENCE
The Law Court first encountered a laches defense in a child sup-
port arrearage case in 1989 in Jack v. Department of Human Serv-
14. See infra note 103.
15. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (5), (6) (West Supp. 1995-1996) provides:
5. Best interest of the child. The court, in making an award of parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to a minor child, shall apply the
standard of the best interest of the child.... In applying this standard, the
court shall consider the following factors:
A. The age of the child;
B. The relationship of the child with the child's parents and any
other persons who may significantly affect the child's welfare;
C. The preference of the child, if old enough to express a meaning-
ful preference;
D. The duration and adequacy of the child's current living arrange-
ments and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
E. The stability of any proposed living arrangements for the child;
F. The motivation of the parties involved and their capacities to give
the child love, affection and guidance;
G. The child's adjustment to the child's present home, school and
community;
H. The capacity of each parent to allow and encourage frequent and
continuing contact between the child and the other parent, including
physical access;
I. The capacity of each parent to cooperate or to learn to cooperate
in child care;
J. Methods for assisting parental cooperation and resolving disputes
and each parent's willingness to use those methods;
K. The effect on the child if one parent has sole authority over the
child's upbringing;
K-1. The existence of a history of domestic abuse between the par-
ents,...
K-2. The existence of any history of child abuse by a parent; and
L. All other factors having a reasonable bearing on the physical and
psychological well-being of the child.
6. Order. The order of the court shall award allocated parental rights
and responsibilities, shared parental rights and responsibilities or sole pa-
rental rights and responsibilities according to the best interest of the child.
[Vol. 48:153
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ices.1 6 In Jack, an ex-husband proposed that the doctrine of laches
should bar the Department of Human Services' (DHS) six-year-old
claim against him for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) payments made on behalf of his child. The court reiterated
the definition of laches found in Leathers v. Stewart.'7 "'Laches, in
legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disad-
vantage to another. So long as the parties are in the same condition,
it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly
. 18 The court held that such a defense would bar the DHS's
claim only if Jack demonstrated that the six-year delay caused him
that which is essential to a laches defense: prejudice.' Jack's dem-
onstration, however, was insufficient and the court rejected his
claim.20
In the three cases that followed Jack,2 the court repeatedly found
that each parent failed to make the necessary showing of prejudice.
In so finding, the court neither provided an affirmative definition of
prejudice nor answered the threshold question of whether laches
could or should defeat an action for child support arrearages. In
Carter v. Carter' the court was not persuaded that a mother's
eleven-year delay in seeking child support caused prejudice to the
children's father.3 The court provided some guidance on the con-
cept of prejudice when it suggested that the defendant did not show
that he undertook any obligation he would have forsaken had the
plaintiff asserted her rights earlier.24 Rather, the defendant's consis-
tent employment from the time of the divorce and throughout the
following eleven years indicated that he had been capable of paying
16. 556 A.2d 1093 (Me. 1989).
17. 108 Me. 96, 79 A. 16 (1911).
18. i& at 102, 79 A. at 18 (quoting Chase v. Chase, 37 A. 804, 805 (R.I. 1897)).
The court further stated:
[W]hen, knowing his rights, [the plaintiff] takes no steps to enforce them
until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed
that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced.
delay becomes inequitable, and operates as an estoppel against the asser-
tion of the right.
Id.
19. Jack v. Department of Human Servs.. 556 A.2d at 1095.
20. Id The court also rejected Jack's laches argument because the defense ap-
plies only to equitable actions. Id. (citing Strickland v. Cousens Realty, Inc., 484
A.2d 1006, 1008 (Me. 1984)). The administrative proceeding under review was a
statutory action to establish Jack's debt and therefore the doctrine of laches was
inapplicable. The court declined to determine whether, in an appropriate applica-
tion, the defense of laches would be available against the State. Id.
21. Trimble v. Commissioner, Dep't of Human Servs., 635 A.2d 937 (Me. 1993);
Schneider v. Department of Human Servs., 617 A.2d 211 (Me. 1992); Carter v.
Carter, 611 A.2d 86 (Me. 1992).
22. 611 A.2d 86 (Me. 1992).




the monthly child support payments at the time they were due, and
that he was able to pay the $17,129 arrearage debt.25 The defend-
ant's ongoing financial stability contradicted his assertions of preju-
dice and the court rejected his laches defense.26
In both Schneider v. Department of Human Services27 and Trimble
v. Commissioner, Department of Human Services28 the court again
avoided the question of whether the defense of laches ever could
defeat an action for child support arrearages. The children's father
in Schneider presented no evidence of prejudice and the court re-
jected his defense with a firm reminder: "Laches cannot be predi-
cated on delay alone."' 29 In Trimble, the defendant resorted to self-
help measures by ceasing to make support payments after his for-
mer wife denied him visitation with his children for several years.31
He testified that his former wife then offered to permit him to re-
sume contact with the children if he would relinquish to her his cus-
todianship of the children's $12,000 mutual fund.31 He did so, but
his former wife continued to prohibit him from contacting the chil-
dren.32 The defendant's persistent efforts to maintain a relationship
with his children, however, neither convinced the court that he was
prejudiced by plaintiff's delay, nor elicited the court's approval of
"the kind of self-help to which Trimble resorted., 33 The court took
a firm position that self-help modifications in child support cases are
unlikely to survive the court's scrutiny.
The court again disapproved of a defendant's reliance on a self-
help approach as a way to modify court ordered child support pay-
ments in Ashley v. State. 4 The defendant, Ashley, presented an eq-
uitable estoppel defense claiming that he and his ex-wife had agreed
on a modification. Nonetheless, the court held that his participation
25. let at 86-87.
26. The defendant challenged the District Court's failure to apply not only
laches, but also equitable estoppel, waiver, and the statute of limitations. The court
found that he did not make the requisite showing to satisfy any of these defenses.
The court also addressed for the first time the application of the statute of limita-
tions to an action for child support arrearages. The court asked whether past due
payments of child support were the equivalent of judgments falling within the excep-
tion for actions based on judgments or decrees. The court determined that an order
of child support was essentially a "judgment in monthly installments," and that such
an order is an action on a judgment. Iat at 87-88 (quoting Britton v. Britton, 671
P.2d 1135, 1139 (N.M. 1983)).
27. 617 A.2d 211 (Me. 1992).
28. 635 A.2d 937 (Me. 1993).
29. Schneider v. Department of Human Servs., 617 A.2d at 212 (citing Carter v.
Carter, 611 A.2d at 87; Tewksbury v. Noyes, 23 A.2d 204, 207 (Me. 1941)).
30. Trimble v. Commissioner, Dep't of Human Servs., 635 A.2d at 938.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id at 939 (citing Wood v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 288 (Me. 1979)).
34. 642 A.2d 176 (Me. 1994).
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in creating a private agreement "frustrated the court's power."5
His decision to ignore the court order and to rely, instead, on a pri-
vate agreement with his former wife was "neither reasonable nor
justifiable., 3 6
Ashley asserted equitable estoppel rather than laches as his de-
fense. Like the previous laches defense cases, however, Ashley's
failure to make the showing necessary to establish his defense left
unresolved whether any equitable defense, in this case equitable es-
toppel, could defeat an action for child support arrearages. The de-
cision affirmed the court's growing disdain for private, self-help
support agreements between divorced parents.
III. Fsco V. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
Richard Fisco and Janet Fisco (now Westhoff) were granted a di-
vorce by the supreme court in Suffolk County, New York, on Octo-
ber 30, 1979.11 Westhoff was awarded custody of the couple's two
children, Rigel, age five, and Alia, age two. Pursuant to a stipula-
tion agreement38 the court ordered Fisco to pay $37.50 per week in
child support for each child.39 In accordance with the agreement,
Fisco began paying the child support obligation in August 1979. The
following May, Westhoff presented Fisco with a written modification
agreement. The modification informed Fisco that Westhoff was em-
ployed, remarried, and able and willing to support the children with-
out his financial or parental support.' It released Fisco from his
child support obligation in exchange for terminating his visitation
rights with his children. Westhoff signed this agreement and had it
notarized. Fisco did not sign the agreement.4'
Fisco left New York and settled in Maine with his second wife and
her two children from a prior relationship. Fisco and his second wife
had two children of their own. In 1988 the Social Security and Vet-
erans' Administrations determined that Fisco was disabled as of
1983 and he began to receive disability benefits.42 On December 3,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Brief of Appellee at 1, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.d 274
(Me. 1995) (CUM-94-662).
38. The parties entered into the stipulation agreement on August 10, 1979. Brief
of Appellant at 1, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d 274 (Me. 1995)
(CUM-94-662).
39. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d 274, 274 (Me. 1995).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Fisco began receiving benefits from both agencies in 1988, retroactive to
1983. Brief of Appellant at 2, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662).
Both the Social Security Administration and the Veterans' Administration consid-
ered him unemployable due to disabilities resulting from his service in the Vietnam
War. He also received public assistance between April 1984 and January 1987. Brief
of Appellee at 1, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662). Beginning
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1992, twelve years after his former wife presented him with the
modification, Fisco received a notice of debt from DHS 43 alleging a
child support debt to Westhoff in the amount of $50,625."
Fisco sought administrative review of the debt and at the hearing
he raised the defense of laches.45 The DHS hearing officer recog-
nized that the consideration of the defense of laches as a bar to Wes-
thoff's recovery was beyond his jurisdiction46 and re-established
Fisco's debt at $34,347.47 On review,' the superior court applied
the doctrine of laches and barred recovery, finding that "a reason-
in 1988 both children received a monthly benefit from the Social Security Adminis-
tration. The Social Security Administration sent the money directly to the children.
Brief of Appellant at 2, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662).
43. The Suffolk County Family Court forwarded the petition to DHS in Maine
pursuant to Maine's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 331-420 (West 1981 and Supp. 1995-1996), repealed
by Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 421-
429B (West Supp. 1995-1996). In 1949 New York reacted to the problem of fathers
who had left their families and refused to pay support by passing a law that allowed
a mother or child to begin a lawsuit to collect support in the state where they lived
and enforce it in the state where the child's father had gone. Within a year, ten
other states adopted similar legislation, and the national Conference of Commission-
ers of Uniform Laws promulgated the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (URESA). UNiF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A.
553 (1968). Every state adopted the law. LIEBERMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
44. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d 274, 275 (Me. 1995).
45. Id
46. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 500(1)(G) (West 1981 and Supp. 1995-1996)
provides:
1. Notice of debt. In addition to conforming with the requirements of
the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, Title 5, section 9052, subsection
4, notice of debt shall include:
G. A statement that at the administrative hearing only the following
issues shall be considered:
(1) The receipt of public assistance by the responsible parent;
(2) Uncredited cash payments;
(3) The amount of the debt accrued and accruing;
(4) The accuracy of the terms of the court or administrative or-
der as stated in the notice of debt; and
(5) The maintenance of any required medical or dental insur-
ance coverage.
See also Ashley v. State, 642 A.2d 176 (Me. 1994) (asserting that the DHS is without
jurisdiction to consider the equitable defense of estoppel) (citing rimble v. Com-
missioner, Dep't of Human Servs., 635 A.2d 937 (Me. 1993)) (explaining that
although the Department of Human Services is without jurisdiction to consider equi-
table issues in support of enforcement proceedings, the applicable DHS regulation
contemplates the presentation of some equitable issues evidence at the administra-
tive level).
47. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 275. Although the notice
of debt established Fisco's arrearage at $50,625, the hearing officer gave Fisco credit
for child support payments to May 1980. He further deducted Fisco's child support
obligation for the period from April 1984 through January 1987 when he received
public assistance; for the four months his son Rigel lived with him; and for the pay-
ments that were made to his children by the Social Security Administration. This
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able person in Fisco's situation would have relied, as he did, on Wes-
thoff's offer and her apparent compliance with her part of the
agreement."4 9 Although neither Fisco nor the court signed Wes-
thoff's modification or incorporated it into the Divorce Decree, the
superior court found that both parents substantially abided by its
terms .50
On appeal,5 ' DHS urged the Law Court to find that Fisco did not
sustain the prejudice element of laches. 2 DHS cited Trimble v.
Commissioner, Department of Human Services53 to demonstrate the
proposition that Fisco's reliance on the modification was an insuffi-
cient showing of detriment, change of position, or prejudice due to
the delay.' DHS argued that Fisco's claim that forfeiture of his visi-
left him an arrearage of $34,347. Brief of Appellant at 3, Fisco v. Department of
Human Servs. (CUM-94-662).
Several jurisdictions have taken the position that an obligor parent may be al-
lowed credit against child support arrearages for expenses accrued as a result of his
custody of the child, or for other voluntary or compelling expenditures made on
behalf of the child. This credit is contingent upon whether equity would so dictate
under the circumstances involved and, whether such an allowance would not do an
injustice to the mother. Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Right to Credit on Ac-
crued Support Payments for Time Child is in Father's Custody or for Other Voluntary
Expenditures, 47 A.L.R 3d 1031, 1035-38 (1973).
48. ME. R. Crv. P. 80(C) provides for superior court review of final agency ac-
tions or failures or refusals of an agency to act.
49. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d 274, 275 (Me. 1995).
50. Fisco v. Sheehan, No. CV-93-1348, decision and order at 2. Fisco tried to
contact his children by calling Westhoff's mother and by contacting the superinten-
dent of Rigel and Alia's school. Alia contacted her father in 1990, and Rigel lived
with Fisco in 1991 for four months prior to his eighteenth birthday. Brief of Appel-
lant at 2, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662). The trial court
found, however, that the parties "substantially abided by their bargain." Fisco v.
Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 276 (Dana, .1. dissenting). But see Brief
of Appellant at 11, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662).
51. DHS asserted that the only issue on appeal was the legal significance of the
facts. DHS reminded the court that the appropriate standard of review did not re-
quire deference to the superior court's finding of facts. DHS reasoned that because
the superior court decided the case on the basis of the same written record which
appeared before the Law Court, the case was indistinguishable from others brought
before the superior court pursuant to Rule 80 (c) of the Maine Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Brief of Appellant at 7, Fisco v. Department of Human Sers. (CUM-94-662)
(citing Vector Mktg. Co. v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 610 A.2d 272, 274
(Me. 1992)). The Law Court granted deference to the superior court but found its
decision clearly erroneous.
52. Brief of Appellant at 7-11, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-
662).
53. 635 A.2d 937 (Me. 1993).
54. "In order to prevail with such a defense, the defendant-husband must also
establish that he was prejudiced by the delay." Brief of Appellant at 10, Fisco v.
Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662) (emphasis added).
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tation rights constituted prejudice due to delay was insufficient" be-
cause Fisco neither signed the modification nor abided by its
terms.56 Furthermore, Fisco's conduct constituted a "self-help" ap-
proach previously disapproved of by the court in Trimble.-7 DHS
reasoned that the court similarly should disapprove of Fisco's reli-
ance on the modification and therefore deem Fisco's claim of preju-
dice insufficient.58
Fisco argued that he "changed his position"59 in reliance on his
former wife's representations in the modification agreement. He
sought no direct contact with his children; he remarried, moved to
Maine, and took on the financial responsibilities of a second family;
and he did not pursue a career.6" These lifestyle "choices" would
become prejudices if the court required Fisco to pay his child sup-
port debt. Without explaining the distinction, Fisco asserted that his
discontinuance of child support payments was not the kind of self-
help disapproved of by the court in Trimble.61 Finally, Fisco argued
that although he did not sign the agreement, by complying with its
terms "in effect ... he did give up his rights."'62
The Law Court rejected the lower court's finding that a reason-
able person would have relied on Westhoff's offer, calling Fisco's
reliance on "this kind of informal agreement" unreasonable and un-
justifiable. 63 Notwithstanding his reliance on the modification, the
court was unconvinced by Fisco's assertions of prejudice. The court
acknowledged that Westhoff's delay in bringing the enforcement ac-
55. DHS did not address Fisco's other claims of prejudice: forgoing a career and
taking on the additional financial responsibilities of supporting a new family. Brief
of Appellee at 7, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662).
56. Brief of Appellant at 11, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-
662).
[T]he record.., discloses that notwithstanding his claim that he gave up all
contact with his children in exchange for not making child support pay-
ments, Mr. Fisco did seek contact with his children. He attempted to con-
tact them through his former wife's relatives, through the School
Department, and by sending a friend to contact his former wife. He con-
tacted the Department of Human Services every two years where he was
advised to seek private counsel.
57. Trimble v. Commissioner, Dep't of Human Servs., 635 A.2d at 939. The court
stated: "We have never sanctioned the kind of self-help to which Trimble resorted
by simply ceasing payments when his former wife stopped permitting visitation."
See also Wood v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 287 (Me. 1979) ("The policy of the law is to
discourage self-help... when modification of decrees concerning child custody and
support is justified.").
58. Brief of Appellant at 9-10, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-
662).
59. Brief of Appellee at 8, Fisco v. Department of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662).
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7-8.
63. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d 274, 275 (Me. 1995).
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tion did prejudice Fsco, but it criticized his responsibility in creating
the circumstances.' a Rather than petitioning the court either to en-
force his visitation rights or to modify his support obligation, Fsco
ignored a court order-conduct the court said amounted to deser-
tion and non-support.' The court saw Fsco's acquiescence in as-
serting his own rights as a bar to the assertion of laches, 6 and
rejected his equitable defense.67
The dissenting justices agreed with the superior court finding that
"Westhoff's twelve-year delay in seeking arrearages greatly
prejudiced Fisco." t The dissent discerned prejudice in several con-
texts. First, Fisco lost the benefit of countless, now unrecoverable
visits with his two children.6 9 Second, Fsco's fully disabled status
would have entitled him to judicial modification or relief from child
support payments. The crux of the dissent's distress appears to be:
Why should Fsco have to pay $35,000 now, if petitioning the court
would have relieved him of his child support obligation? The dis-
sent acknowledged that the agreement benefitted Fsco somewhat,
but the dissenting justices remained unmoved by the majority's con-
cern over Fisco's participation in the wrongdoing. "Although the
64. Id. at 275-76. The court expressed disapproval of Fisco's role in creating the
situation:
Westhoff's delay in bringing the enforcement action certainly prejudiced
Fisco, but he as much as Westhoff is responsible for the situation in which
he now finds himself. His testimony demonstrates that he was at least
vaguely aware that Westhoff's proposal improperly modified the judicially
imposed rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the children.
Yet he never petitioned the court either to enforce his visitation rights or,
even after his economic circumstances changed, to modify his support obli-
gation. Instead, he chose to abide by an agreement that... benefitted him
at least in part. His part in the delay amounts to . . . desertion and
nonsupport.
ld.
65. Id. at 276.
66. Id. (" 'When both parties are at fault, neither can assert laches against the
other.' ") (quoting Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 137 A.2d 569, 572 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1958)).
67. Id. ("'[T]he law will prevail where the equities are equal.'") (quoting Sar-
gent v. Coolidge, 433 A.2d 738, 743 (Me. 1981)).
68. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 276 (Dana, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. The dissent said, "[H]ad [Fisco] known years ago that his former wife would
ultimately bring this action, he could have obtained judicial relief from the prior
judgment because of his total disability." Id This assertion is not entirely accurate.
Fisco may have been able to obtain a modification once he acquired the fully dis-
abled status. The Veterans' Administration determined that he was not disabled
until 1983, four years after his divorce. Brief of Appellee at 1. Fisco v. Department
of Human Servs. (CUM-94-662). The modification for which he may have been
entitled, therefore, would not include the four years between his divorce and the
time he was considered disabled. Furthermore, while Fisco might have been re-




agreement may have benefitted Fisco in part, implicit in the Supe-
rior Court's decision is the finding that the equities were far from
equal."71
In addition to misconstruing the import of the facts, according to
the dissent, the majority also demonstrated its confusion of equita-
ble estoppel and laches defenses in its statement that Fisco's "reli-
ance on Westhoff's abiding by an agreement we cannot credit does
not constitute the prejudice necessary to establish laches."7 In criti-
cizing the majority's emphasis on a "reasonable reliance" require-
ment of an equitable estoppel defense,73 the dissenting justices
described the distinguishing qualities of laches: "In contrast [to eq-
uitable estoppel], laches is 'an omission to assert a right for an un-
reasonable and unexplained length of time and under circumstances
prejudicial to the adverse party.' "I' The dissent refused to consider
"reliance," applied a conventional laches formula,75 and concluded
that Fisco's defense was properly based on the prejudice flowing
from Westhoff's failure to assert her claim within a reasonable
time.7 6 "Whether Fisco's reliance on the agreement was reasonable
is irrelevant to the analysis in this case."7 7
The dissent would have affirmed the decision of the superior
court, leaving the parties to their bargain.78 Disregarding the infor-
malities of Westhoff's unincorporated modification, the dissent in-
stead focused upon the twelve years during which Westhoff received
the "benefit of her bargain."79 It dismissed Westhoff's demand for
the child support payments as a mere change of mind.80 The dis-
senting justices were also disturbed because Fisco's oldest child had
reached the age of majority8' by the time Westhoff filed her com-
plaint. Armed with a finding of prejudice adequate to satisfy a
laches defense, they affirmatively embraced the propriety of equita-
ble defenses in child support arrearage cases.'
71. Id at 277.
72. Id (emphasis omitted).
73. The majority cited Ashley as support for the proposition that Fisco's reliance
on the agreement was unreasonable and unjustifiable. Id. at 275 (citing Ashley v.
State, 642 A.2d 176, 176 (Me. 1994)).
74. Id at 276 (Dana, J., dissenting) (citing A.H. Benoit & Co. v. Johnson, 160
Me. 201, 207, 202 A.2d 1. 5 (1964)).
75. lI
76. Idr at 277.
77. Id
78. Id at 276.
79. Id
80. Id
81. Most jurisdictions have determined that disputes over child support no longer
have merit once the children are 18 years old. Although Rigel had just turned 18
when Westhoff initiated this suit, Alia was still a minor. The dissent mistakenly as-
serted that both children had reached the age of majority. Id.
82. The dissent stated, "'[W]e now align ourselves with the majority of jurisdic-




A. The Fisco Decision
The Fisco decision heightens the prejudice standard in laches de-
fenses by imposing a reasonable reliance requirement on any laches
defense that includes a private agreement. The majority refuses to
evaluate prejudice without deciding whether reliance upon the
agreement was reasonable. Finding it unreasonable to rely on such
an agreement, the majority is not satisfied by Fsco's showing of
prejudice. The dissent also looks for a showing of prejudice but
finds sufficient evidence supporting the defense. To the dissent, it is
entirely irrelevant that Fisco's prejudice derives from the parents'
decision to ignore the superior court's child support order.
An outcome-driven analysis of the doctrine of equity leads both
the majority and the dissent to take advantage of equity's vulnera-
bility to judicial discretion. The result is an inaccurate application of
the discretionary, but precise doctrine of equity.
1. Prejudice, Reliance, and Private Agreements
Concededly, the court's rejection of Fisco's showing of prejudice
is an impediment to the assertion of laches defenses in child support
arrearage cases; its broader impact is to deter all equitable defenses.
First, the decision takes the Law Court's already strict requirement
of prejudice in laches/child support arrearage cases and heightens
that standard further. While the court has not given an affirmative
definition of what constitutes prejudice for the purpose of asserting
laches, through its repeated rejection of the defense the court has
provided a definition of what prejudice is not. Prejudice is not as-
serted by showing mere delay;83 nor is there prejudice to a defend-
ant whose former wife fails to notify him of his children's location
asserted by the obligor in a proceeding to enforce or modify an order for child sup-
port or, as here, to reduce child support arrearages to judgment.'" Id. (quoting
Parkinson v. Parkinson, 796 P.2d 229, 231 (Nev. 1990)).
The dissent misconstrues the majority's reliance on Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann,
Inc., 137 A.2d 569 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1958). The dissent states:
[T]he Court's reliance on a 1958 New Jersey Superior Court decision is
unpersuasive support for its conclusion that the trial court erred in deter-
mining that the equitable defense of laches is applicable to this case. The
trial court's decision finds substantial support from the many jurisdictions
that in recent years have held that equitable defenses are available in sup-
port enforcement actions.
Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 276. The majority did not rely on
Mitchell for the proposition that equitable defenses are not available. Rather, it
cites Mitchell for the much more limited proposition that laches is not available
when both parties are at fault. lI& The majority's reliance on this case does not
speak to the issue of the general availability of the defense, but rather to the specific
circumstances in which laches defenses are inappropriate.
83. See Schneider v. Department of Human Servs., 617 A.2d 211,212 (Me. 1992).
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for eleven years;' 4 denial of visitation rights is likewise an insuffi-
cient display of prejudice;85 and now, with Fisco, prejudice is neither
the acquisition of new financial obligations nor the decision to forgo
pursuit of a career, particularly when those obligations and decisions
were based upon an unincorporated, private agreement between the
parties. 6 By eliminating additional possibilities from the prejudice
concept, the court continues to refine the definition and heighten
the prejudice standard, the essential element of the defense.
Second, the Fisco decision functions as a deterrent to the use of
laches defenses in child support arrearage cases by establishing that
it is neither inequitable nor unjust to the defendant to enforce the
terms of a child support order when a private agreement is the basis
for the defendant's asserted prejudice. By loosely applying the deci-
sion in Ashley, the majority in Fisco invites judges to disregard evi-
dence of prejudice where the claim involves a private agreement.
Although not explicit, the Fisco opinion effectively holds that as a
matter of law, a showing of prejudice will be deemed insufficient
where parties engaged in private agreements. The court achieves
this by grafting the holding of Ashley onto the facts of Fisco: Ashley
states, "[The defendant's] reliance on a private agreement with his
former wife to ignore the court order to pay child support was
neither reasonable nor justifiable."87 Although application of the
Ashley holding to the Fisco facts seems appropriate, Ashley is less
relevant than the court suggests. In Ashley the defendant asserted
the defense of equitable estoppel, which specifically requires a
showing of reasonable reliance on an assertion or an agreement.
Laches and estoppel, however, are not equivalent concepts; they are
governed by different rules. The rules governing estoppel are more
clearly defined and less flexibly applied than those governing
laches.88 The Fisco court was not obligated to find the same ele-
ments required for an equitable estoppel defense.89 Nonetheless,
84. See Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86, 87 (Me. 1992).
85. See Trimble v. Commissioner, Dep't of Human Servs., 635 A.2d 937, 938-39
(Me. 1993).
86. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 275-76.
87. Ashley v. State, 642 A.2d 176, 176 (Me. 1994).
88. Gillons v. Shell Co. of Cal., 86 F.2d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 689 (1937) (holding that laches and estoppel are governed by different rules;
rules governing laches are directed more intimately to conscience of chancellor who
must exercise discretion)). See also California Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin
Growers of Cal., 81 F.2d. 674,679 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936) (noting
that laches differs from estoppel in that laches is based upon the failure of a party to
enforce its rights for such an unreasonable amount of time that equitable relief will
not be granted).
89. The court has recognized the distinct requirements of the equitable defenses
(laches, equitable estoppel, and waiver). See, e.g., Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86 (Me.
1992). In Carter the court stated:
Assuming estoppel, laches, or waiver could defeat an action for support
arrearages[,] ... defendant has failed to make the showing necessary to
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the court incorporates the severity of the Ashley decision by affixing
the concept of "reasonable reliance" onto the formula for laches.
In compelling language the court in Ashley states. "Conduct such
as Ashley's frustrated the court's power to determine the amount of
child support and cannot be countenanced."90 The court in Fisco
interprets this statement as a condemnation of all self-help agree-
ments pertaining to child support. That interpretation, however, re-
quires the court to overlook the factual distinctions between the two
cases. For example, in Ashley the divorce court rejected the parties'
support proposal as insufficient and ordered a greater amount in
support.9 The couple ignored the court's order and privately
agreed that the defendant would pay less.' The Ashley court
seemed particularly displeased with Ashley's defense because the
divorce court had explicitly rejected the agreement. The court's spe-
cific reference to Ashley's conduct suggests that the court condemns
the agreement because Ashley employed self-help which the court
had expressly rejected. Although the decision in Ashley is ambigu-
ous as to whether the court intended to condemn all child support
self-help agreements, the court in Fisco uses Ashley as authority to
reject all self-help. The Fisco court's decision to unilaterally reject
self-help agreements heightens the burden on defendants who raise
equitable defenses to claims for unpaid child support. It also allows
the court to avoid the larger issue: Should the Law Court ever up-
hold equitable defenses in child support arrearage cases?
The dissent correctly defines laches by disregarding the "reason-
able reliance" requirement imposed by the majority.9 3 But the dis-
sent's insistence on precise doctrinal definitions distracts it from
careful consideration of the parties' self-help agreement, which it
condones without reservation. 4 The dissent finds prejudice in
Fisco's changed employment and financial circumstances, and in the
visitations with his children that he forfeited, 95 both of which di-
rectly result from the deal struck between Fisco and Westhoff in
complete disregard of the court order. The dissent ignores that the
source of Fisco's prejudice is a self-help agreement, and instead, re-
establish each of these defenses. "Before the doctrine of equitable estoppel
may be invoked, the declarations or acts relied upon must have induced the
party seeking to enforce an estoppel to do what resulted to his detriment
and what he would not otherwise have done."... [T~he doctrine of laches
requires a showing that the delay caused prejudice .... [Wlaiver requires
the intentional relinquishment of a known right ....
Ld. at 87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. Ashley v. State, 642 A.2d at 176.
91. Id.
92. Id.






iterates that the defendant in Ashley presented an equitable estop-
pel defense, and that laches does not require reasonable reliance. In
so doing, the dissent legitimizes the agreement by concentrating on
the elements required for a laches defense and by refusing to grap-
ple with the assertion in Ashley that some, if not all self-help agree-
ments are suspect.
2. The Doctrine of Equity
The court in Fisco concludes its decision with two quotations
about the law of equity. It quotes Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc.96
for the proposition that " '[w]hen both parties are at fault, neither
can assert laches against the other' "; 97 and Sargent v. Coolidge98 for
the proposition that " '[t]he law will prevail where the equities are
equal.' "9 In applying these principles to the Fisco case, the court
establishes an unrefined application of equity. Neither the majority
nor the dissent recognizes that although principles of equity are gov-
erned by significant judicial interpretation and discretion, the con-
cept of equity is subtle. Mitchell stands for the distinct proposition
that an assertion of laches becomes illegitimate if the defendant par-
ticipated in creating the plaintiff's delay. The court asserted that the
"[d]efendants' contributions to and acquiescence in the delays pre-
clude them from now complaining."' 00 In Sargent the Law Court
explained that in a case where the litigation was spurred by a mutual
mistake of fact, defendants' claim would fail in accordance with the
maxim that the law will prevail where the equities are equal.' 0 '
In Fisco the court allows its disapproval of the defendant's relin-
quishment of visitation rights to obscure the subtleties of equity.
Yet unlike the defendant in Mitchell, Fisco did not participate in any
way in the plaintiff's delay in asserting her rights. He did not hide
his whereabouts from his former wife or obstruct her from asserting
her rights. The court, however, concludes that because the defend-
ant did something wrong by being "vaguely aware that Westhoff's
proposal improperly modified the judicially imposed rights and obli-
gations of the parties,"' 02 laches is not an available defense. This
position obscures the concept of equity by basing its denial of the
defense, in part, on the defendant's general contributions to the cre-
ation of the circumstances and by ignoring the fact that the defend-
ant's wrongdoing did not contribute to the plaintiff's delay in
asserting her rights.
96. 137 A.2d 569 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958).
97. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 276.
98. 433 A.2d 738 (Me. 1981).
99. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 276.
100. Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 137 A.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
101. Sargent v. Coolidge, 433 A.2d at 741, 743 (citing Foster v. Kingsley, 67 Me.
152, 156 (1877); Lumbert v. Hill, 41 Me. 475, 483 (1856)).
102. Fisco v. Department of Human Servs., 659 A.2d at 275-76.
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If Fisco's evidence of prejudice were founded solely upon the de-
nial of his visitation rights, the court's application of equity would
appear more discriminating. If this were the case, the court could
make the principled determination that the prejudice he sustained in
not seeing his children is negated by the fact that he caused prejudice
to himself. Yet Fisco's claim of prejudice also includes his accumula-
tion of new financial obligations. The court has established a prece-
dent for the future whereby virtually any evidence of wrongdoing on
the part of a defendant will defeat an equitable defense. In cases
involving children and their rights to both financial and parental
support, such a crude application of equity may conveniently
amount to justice. In its effort to deter divorced parents from bar-
gaining with their rights and the rights of their children, however,
the court has muddied the waters of equity.
B. Family Financial Responsibility: The Legal Obligation to
Provide for the Children
The Law Court went far in Fisco towards limiting relief from child
support obligations. While the court's approach has been effective
in enforcing child support arrearages, its future effectiveness de-
pends upon either similarly "insubstantial" demonstrations of preju-
dice, or continued mutations of laches, estoppel, and equity.
Instead, the Law Court should abandon these doctrines in child sup-
port arrearage cases for two compelling reasons. First, Maine's fam-
ily financial responsibility statute provides that child support is a
basic legal right of the State's children and that mothers and fathers
have a legal obligation to provide financial support for their chil-
dren."°3 After the court has entered a decree for child support,
there is no principled reason why the court should permit abandon-
ment of that duty merely because ex-spouses initiate litigation. Sec-
ond, judicial economy will be served best by such an approach.
1. Invalidating Equitable Defenses
A child's legal right to financial support from his parents is a legis-
lative construction that deserves unequivocal recognition by the
Law Court. Neither the elements of laches, nor the elements of the
103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 306 (West Supp. 1995-1996). The statute
provides that "[t]he Legislature finds and declares that child support is a basic legal
right of the State's parents and children, that mothers and fathers have a legal obli-
gation to provide financial support for their children .... " Il See also Mn. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 421 (1), (3) (West Supp. 1995-1996):
"[c]hild" means an individual, whether over or under the age of majority,
who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the individual's parent
or who is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the
parent.... "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or imposable
by law to provide support for a child, spouse or former spouse, including an
unsatisfied obligation to provide support.
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
other equitable defenses need be nor should be considered by the
court if parents' duty to provide children with economic sustenance
is given genuine recognition.
If the courts are to give consistent legitimacy to the notion that
financial support is a child's basic legal right, then the affirmative
defense of laches is unconditionally inappropriate. Laches requires
a failure to assert a right resulting in forfeiture of that right. A par-
ent should have no standing to waive his or her child's right to re-
ceive support.1°4 Laches requires that the claimant's delay in
asserting the right results in prejudice to the defendant. To deter-
mine whether a laches defense is available, therefore, courts natu-
rally must focus their inquiry on the claimant's delay and, as a result
of such delay, prejudice to the defendant. Such a defense does not
require even the pretense of inquiry into a child's right to parental
support. Instead, as in Fisco, the court must work hard to construct
an unwieldy prejudice standard in an attempt not to find an excuse
to pay support arrearages.
Other jurisdictions have avoided this manipulation of equitable
defenses in child support cases. In Lyon v. Lyon'05 the Supreme
Court of Vermont held that child support payments are made for
the support, maintenance, and education of the children.10 6 The
rights of the children are to be served and protected, as their welfare
is of paramount concern. Accordingly, the court stated:
[P]laintiff may not be found to have waived her child's right to
receive support from defendant by her failure to enforce the
child support order or to reduce the arrearages to a judgment
in a more timely fashion.
The child was not guilty of laches or acquiescence, and we will
not attribute any such guilt on the part of the plaintiff to the
child for whose benefit the original support was made.10 7
The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the trial court's judgment
for the arrearages owed by the defendant, stating definitively that
the "affirmative defenses [of laches and equitable estoppel] are not
available in an action brought to secure enforcement of a child sup-
port order."'1 8 The Virginia Court of Appeals similarly held in Tay-
104. See Nicholas A. Cipriani, Child Support Enforcement Curriculum: Defenses,
Juv. & FAM. Cr. J., Fall 1985, at 115, 122 n.26 (citing Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d
798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Lyon v. Lyon, 466 A.2d 1186 (Vt. 1983)).
105. 466 A.2d 1186 (Vt. 1983).
106. Id. at 1189 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 651 (repealed 1987)). Current
sections of the statute reflect purposes similar to those found in repealed section
651. See title 15, §§ 650-663 (1989).
107. Lyon v. Lyon, 466 A.2d at 1189 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1188. The court cited Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), Holmes v. Burke, 462 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1971), and Paterson v. Paterson,
242 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. 1976), as illustrative of other jurisdictions where child support
arrearages may not be defeated by affirmative defenses.
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lor v. Taylor 09 that "laches may not be interposed as a defense to a
[child] support arrearage." 110 Likewise, in Kansas, laches and equi-
table estoppel are not permissible defenses against child support
debts any time during a child's minority. The Kansas Court of Ap-
peals explained in Wornkey v. Wornkey" l' that laches was barred
because support of children is a matter of important social con-
cem.112 "Child support is an obligation a parent owes the state and
the children. This obligation... continues through the child's mi-
nority, and an action to enforce the obligation may be brought at
any time during the child's minority. '11 3
A direct, affirmative focus on the child's dependence upon the
financial support of his or her parents reveals the impropriety of
equitable defenses. None of the equitable theories adequately ac-
count for the relevant interests at stake when parents fail to comply
with support orders. For example, equitable estoppel requires the
109. 418 S.E.2d 900 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
110. Id. at 902. See also Richardson v. Moore, 229 SE.2d 864 (Va. 1976). In
Richardson the plaintiff argued that a trial court has the power to relieve the hus-
band's estate of arrearages in past due payments. The court disagreed. "Laches is
an equitable defense, but 'even a court of equity, in an effort to do equity, cannot
disregard the provisions of a lawful decree .... '. Id. at 866 (citing Fearon v.
Fearon, 154 S.E.2d 165, 168 (Va. 1967)). The Richardson court explained its
rationale:
In the absence of statute, payments exacted by the original decree of di-
vorce become vested as they accrue and the court is without authority to
make any change as to past due installments.
It is the obligation of the divorced husband to pay the specified amounts
according to the terms of the decree and.., he should not be permitted to
vary these terms to suit his convenience. If conditions change... his rem-
edy is to apply to the court for.., relief.
Id. (quoting Cofer v. Cofer, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (Va. 1965); Newton v. Newton, 118
S.E.2d 656,659 (Va. 1961)). The court acknowledged that there is contrary authority
in other jurisdictions. Id.
111. 749 P.2d 1045 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988). See also Grimes v. Grimes, 295 P.2d
646, 648 (Kan. 1956) (asserting that support of children, like custody, is a matter of
social concern; it is an obligation the father owes the state as well as his children);
Effland v. Effland, 237 P.2d 380, 387 (Kan. 1951) (holding that the parental duty to
provide for the support and maintenance of a child continues through the child's
minority and the obligation to support may be enforced by an action at any time
during the child's minority); Peters v. Weber, 267 P.2d 481 (Kan. 1954). In Peters the
court noted that under the circumstances of the case,
we are unwilling to hold that defendant is entitled to invoke the defense of
laches as a bar to the enforcement of his moral and legal obligation to his
minor child. The rights of the latter are not to be waived by the inaction
and passive acquiescence on the part of the mother.
Id. at 486. Kansas has not determined as explicitly as Virginia that laches will never
be appropriate in child support arrearage cases. The Kansas court does state, how-
ever, that provided the children have not reached the age of majority, it is very
unlikely that a laches defense will be permissible. Womkey v. Wornkey, 749 P.2d at
1051.
112. Wornkey v. Wornkey, 749 P.2d at 1051.
113. Id. (citing Strecker v. Wilkinson, 552 P.2d 979 (Kan. 1976)).
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assertions of one party and reasonable reliance resulting in detri-
ment to the other. Equitable defenses are particularly inappropriate
when parents exchange visitation rights for child support because
they deny children the financial and emotional sustenance upon
which their health and development largely depend. The Law
Court's continued amenability to the presentation of these defenses
simply permits parents to trade their children's visitation rights for
their children's right to financial support. If the court had found the
requisite prejudice in Fisco, and if the court had not effectuated its
questionable manipulation of the concepts of prejudice and "reason-
able reliance," the outcome would have been to allow dismissal of
the children's rights on the basis of the parents' "deal." Such a swap
is inappropriate." 4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Bingham v. Bingham" 5 explains the impropriety:
The[] [parents] agreed [that the] [h]usband, the father of
the[ ] children, would be allowed to ignore his parental pre-
rogatives and duties relating to visitation, thus depriving the
children of the companionship, training, care and nurturing to
which they are entitled. In exchange, [the] [m]other bartered
away the children's right to be parentally and financially sup-
ported. In so doing the parties made a "contract" which no
court should condone or perpetuate ....
Parental rights ...may only be terminated or impaired
upon a clear finding by the court after an evidentiary hearing
that it is, in fact, in the best interests of the children to enter
such an order. 16
Condoning the application of contractual or equitable doctrines to
parental obligations fails to respond to, and is plainly incompatible
with the interests of the child. 1 7 Recognizing that child support is a
"basic legal right""' provides the forum in which a child's ongoing
right to parental financial support can be relied upon and legiti-
mized in the eyes of the law.
2. Bridling Equity
Principles of equity provide that if a defendant can prove that a
plaintiff seeking relief has engaged in improper conduct related to
the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff may be denied the opportunity to
114. See, eg., Eliker v. Eliker, 295 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Neb. 1980) ("The right of
visitation ... is not a quid pro quo for the payment of child support .. .
115. 629 P.2d 1297 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
116. Id. at 1299-1300 (emphasis added); see also Lindsay Arthur, Child Support
Enforcement Parental Agreements, Juv. & FAM. C. J., Fall 1985, at 93, 93.
117. See Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Note, Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning
of Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1059, 1068-71 (1984).
118. See supra note 103.
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enforce his or her right.119 The doctrine of equity simply fails to
account for the child's interests. 2 ' When deciding whether to en-
force a child support order, a court's consideration of parents' im-
proper conduct is not appropriate. "The practical effect of denying
parents a remedy is to prevent the child from obtaining the rights to
which he is entitled even though his hands are clean. By automati-
cally refusing to grant a remedy in this situation the court punishes
the child without considering the child's interests.' 2 ' It is unjust
and unfair to deny a child financial support because of an applica-
tion of equity to his parents' behavior. Ridding the child support
enforcement field of appeals to equity will require parents to peti-
tion the court for changes in child support obligations. Otherwise,
the court will inevitably face a situation where the rights of an indis-
putably prejudiced parent supersede the child's right to financial
support.
Decisions in equity allow for considerable judicial discretion.
Nonetheless, where a defendant argues laches, a plaintiff's delay is
excusable in equity only where the delay was induced by the adverse
party. A defendant cannot take advantage of a delay which he him-
self caused or to which he contributed."2 Fisco did not participate
in creating Westhoff's delay. Concededly, the Fisco court's manipu-
lation of equity was effective in prohibiting his defense and provid-
ing for the children's financial support. The result is laudable, but
this application of equity is unbridled. Judicial discretion in the ap-
plication of the equity doctrine often may be fair and appropriate
between two adults. Yet its application to those same adults when
the children's right to financial support should be the judicial focus
is an alarmingly misplaced foundation upon which to rest our chil-
dren's welfare.'"
3. Judicial Economy
The court had compelling reasons for discouraging the self-help
approach in Fisco. Particularly in the context of child support obli-
gations, self-help modifications are not judicially economical. The
parties, as in Fisco, do not avoid litigation through independent
modifications. The courts in Maine expend limited resources to de-
termine child support payments systematically and fairly according
to statutory guidelines. 124 Further, title 19, section 319 of the Maine
119. Taylor, supra note 117, at 1070.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1071.
122. Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1935).
123. It is perhaps difficult to envision discarding equitable principles in litigation
pertaining to child support. Certainly ex-spouses should not be able to wreak havoc
on each others' lives. Invalidating equitable doctrines is not an invitation to take
advantage of the court's concern with the child's welfare.
124. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 311-320 (,Vest Supp. 1995-1996).
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Revised Statutes provides that child support obligations may be
modified when the financial situation of the obligor has changed."25
Sound public policy mandates that parties modify agreements offi-
cially, otherwise "[t]he parent paying support would be encouraged
to reduce support payments unilaterally whenever he believed a
change of circumstances justified a reduction. The policy of the law
is to discourage self-help.. . ."126 Self-help modifications also tend
to defy responsible social and public policy. In light of the economic
and social problems facing children and parents of divorce, 12 7 courts
use judicial discretion in examining laches defenses'28 to minimize
situations in which they must deny past-due child support. Re-
jecting evidence of prejudice where a self-help modification pro-
vided its springboard may achieve this goal. A complete rejection of
equitable defenses, however, may consistently guarantee the en-
forcement of past-due support. Eliminating equitable defenses also
may discourage the modification of agreements that are not judi-
cially approved. Courts need not contort concepts of prejudice or
intertwine doctrinal elements. The defenses simply should not be
allowed.
Elimination of equitable defenses will not inhibit proper judicial
discretion in granting modifications or credit where an obligor
spouse has made non-conforming child support payments or other-
wise has provided for the children. Recognizing that unconven-
tional circumstances surrounding child support may arise ensures
fairness to the parent who provides nonconforming child support,
without undermining the effectiveness of child support
enforcement.129
Perhaps the Law Court is ambivalent about taking the absolutist
approach of rejecting equitable defenses because it has observed
that other jurisdictions recognize and uphold laches and other equi-
125. The statute provides that where there is a substantial change of financial
circumstances, an obligor may modify existing support orders by filing a motion to
the court. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 319 (West Supp. 1994-1995).
126. Wood v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 287 (Me. 1979).
127. See generally Steven W. Caple, Roark v. Roark: An Expansion of the Appli-
cation of Estoppel to Prohibit the Collection of Child Support Arrearages, 45 ARK. L.
REv. 631 (1992) (discussing the impact of a parent's inability to collect child support
on the child's economic, psychological, and social well-being).
128. Cf Sinclair v. Allender, 26 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1947). In examining a laches
defense in a case involving the creation of a trust, the court explained, " 'A court of
equity applies the rule of laches according to its own ideas of right and justice.
Every case is governed by its own circumstances.'" Id. at 329 (quoting Withrow v.
Walker, 47 N.W. 893, 895 (Iowa 1891)).
129. See generally J. Eric Smithburn, Removing Nonconforming Child Support
Payments from the Shadow of the Rule Against Retroactive Modification: A Proposal
for Judicial Discretion, 28 J. FAM. L. 43 (1989-90) (advocating recognition of non-




table defenses in situations factually similar to those that the Law
Court faces. 130 This Author contends that equitable defenses, when
applied to support arrearage cases involving minor children, are
never appropriate. Even interference with visitation rights that rises
to the level of concealment should not affect the support obligation
of the non-custodial parent. A California court recently held that
where a mother conceals her own and her children's whereabouts
from the children's father until the children are no longer minors,
fairness and equity permit the father to estop the mother's claim for
the arrearages that accrue during the period of concealment.' 3' The
court's holding encourages broader acceptance of equitable de-
fenses by failing to declare the impropriety of such defenses in con-
cealment cases involving minor children.132  The court's
unwillingness to provide dicta condemning the equitable defenses
when children are still minors invites injustice by depriving a child of
his or her right to support because of a parent's refusal to abide by a
court order. A child should not be deprived of the right to support
because of the concealing parent's behavior.133 Despite the unfortu-
nate grief that the concealing parent causes to the other parent, the
law should insist that the aggrieved parent petition the courts for
130. See eg., Moffett v. Moffett. 570 So. 2d 691. 692 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (ap-
plying doctrine of laches to mother's claim for child support where father's wherea-
bouts were known during child's minority and child was 22 years old and married at
the time mother requested determination of back child support); Parkinson v. Par-
kinson, 796 P.2d 229, 231 (Nev. 1990) (upholding application of waiver where, de-
spite repeated contact with father for several years subsequent to the time he ceased
making payments, mother never made any demand on father and did not pursue her
legal rights to the funds for five and a half years); Ferree v. Sparks. 601 N.E.2d 568,
570-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (justifying application of laches where mother's delay
in asserting claim to recover unpaid child support caused father material prejudice
by depriving father of his right to visitation); Taylor v. Taylor, 418 S.E.2d 900, 902-03
(Va. App. 1992) (explaining that because District of Columbia law applied, the doc-
trine of laches applied to bar wife's claim for support arrearages, where wife failed
to make support claim for 15 years, while husband's whereabouts were ascertainable
and husband had grown old, retired, remarried, and assumed additional responsibili-
ties, relying to his detriment on lack of prosecution of wife's claim).
131. In re Marriage of Damico, 872 P.2d 126, 133 (Cal. 1994).
132. Id. at 133.
133. The dissent emphasized that the non-custodial parent has adequate reme-
dies against a custodial parent who concealed a child and thus may not use conceal-
ment as a defense to justify violating a child support order. ld. at 137 (Baxter, J.,
dissenting). According to the dissent, the majority rewards a noncustodial parent by
terminating the duty to pay child support without requiring that parent to follow the
legal procedures to obtain this judicial relief, while punishing the custodial parent
for violating the terms of the other parent's visitation order. See April Anstett,
When a Custodial Parent Purposely Conceals the Location of Herself and Child and
the Noncustodial Parent Makes Reasonable Efforts to Locate Them, the Custodial
Parent is Estopped from Collecting Child Support Arrearages for the Tune of Con-
cealmenv In Re Marriage of Damico, 22 PEPP. L REv. 1739 (1995); see also Maria L




relief."3 Giving meaning to the "basic legal right" to child support
means prioritizing the financial needs of children.
V. CONCLUSION
The failure of non-custodial parents to provide support for their
children is an ongoing dilemma for millions of families in this coun-
try.135 At a time when Maine is receiving national attention for its
child support enforcement laws, 36 the Law Court in Fisco height-
ened the evidentiary burden regarding the concept of prejudice and
effectively created a rebuttable presumption that private, self-help
modifications between parents are not legitimate and will serve as
barriers to assertions of prejudice in child support arrearage cases.
The application to Fisco of holdings and principles from cases in-
volving equitable defenses other than laches suggests a general un-
willingness on the part of the Law Court to permit concepts of
equity to estop claims for child support arrearages.
In Fisco the court did not allow the parents' conduct to affect the
rights of the children or state-wide success in the collection of child
support. With public policy and both national and legislative direc-
tives supporting strict enforcement, the Law Court has made asser-
tions of laches, as well as other equitable defenses, extremely
burdensome. This purely result-oriented approach has been effec-
tive. But the court should take the next step toward justice and judi-
cial economy and deny the assertion of equitable defenses in child
support arrearage cases. Although not a legal party to a dispute
involving parental obligations after a divorce, the child is the inte-
gral member of the group that will be affected by the court's action.
Allowing equitable defenses that require courts to grapple with
whether uncooperative parents "reasonably relied" or suffered
"prejudice" promotes disregard of a statutorily imposed presump-
tion: Children have a basic legal right to receive financial support
from their parents. No matter how unwelcoming, the Law Court's
reception to equitable defenses reveals its discomfort with insisting,
134. In Moffat v. Moffat, 612 P.2d 967 (Cal. 1980), the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia expressed sympathy for a father whose ex-wife had denied him visitation with his
children. Still, the court noted other remedies available to the father besides non-
payment. He could have petitioned the court for a change of custody, filed a peti-
tion to hold the mother in contempt, filed a motion to terminate or reduce spousal
support, or filed a motion to require and to insure compliance with the visitation
orders. The court held that the mother's misconduct alone was not enough to estop
her right to child support even though she "cruelly inflict[ed] incalculable damage to
the children's welfare by arbitrarily denying to them the values inherent in a conge-
nial father-child relationship." Id. at 975.
135. Caple, supra note 127, at 631 n.1 (citing OFFicE OF CHILD SUPPORT EN-
FORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 14TH ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 5 (1989)).
136. See supra note 8.
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unequivocally, upon the children's economic sustenance. Although
the opinion in Fisco indicates the court's sincere concern for the
children of divorced parents, it is perplexing that throughout the
Law Court's recent decisions in child support arrearage cases, it
never has relied expressly upon the statutory presumption of a
child's right to financial support. Yet to do so would be to deploy
and legitimize a legislative mandate, avoid further deconstruction of
legal doctrines, and give consistent recognition to a child's right to
financial support.
As between consenting adults like Janet Westhoff and Richard
Fisco, allowing a laches defense may have been an equitable solu-
tion to a situation they both created. But neither the laws of child
support nor those of visitation schedules were established for ex-
spouses. They were established to provide financial and parental
sustenance to the children of divorce. Defenses such as laches may
mean justice for the parents. But to the children, there is no equity
in the bargaining away of their relationships and resources.
The Law Court's decision in Fisco disturbs the refinement of the
law in its application of prior case law, equitable defenses, and the
legal principle of equity. While the court in Fisco did justice to the
unnamed third party, the rejection of equitable defenses, the ele-
ments of which do not even feign consideration of the children, is
long overdue.
Rebecca C. Raskin
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